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1 
Economics of Converging Theoretical Paradigms: 





This paper examines economic consequences of converging theoretical paradigms affecting 
regimes of economic cooperation (RECs). In the past, theoretical paradigms such as capitalism vs. 
socialism or Keynesianism vs. monetarism clearly diverged on structural, organizational and 
operational levels, however in the recent times there are ample evidences showing greater theoretical 
convergence. Literature available on the issue primarily focuses on multilateral/bilateral free trade 
agreements and largely ignores the deeper theoretical realignments causing fundamental shift in the 
structure and reach of RECs. It argues that converging theoretical paradigms (CTPs) are affecting 
basic rationale and structure of cooperative arrangements. Theoretically, the second coming of liberal 
international economic order (LIEO) indicates that the CTPs have evolved around neo-liberal 
economic ideas. Empirically, a critical turn around in Indo-Korean RECs in the post-Cold War period 
– from market-seeking (1960s~1980s) to production-seeking (1990s~2000s), and cluster-seeking phase 
(2000~2007) – demonstrates the positive impact of CTPs.  
 





The liberal international economic order (LIEO) 1820-1913, a first significant example of 
converging theoretical paradigms (CTPs)1 though enforced by imperial-colonial interests, 
marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of bilateral/multilateral economic 
cooperation.2 In this phase, international trade and investment took a quantum leap.3
                                                          
* This paper was first presented at the Conference, titled, Korea and World Economy II, held at 
Washington University, Seattle, USA on 1~2 August 2003. Subsequently, it was revised to 
incorporate various comments and views. 
 The 
1 Converging theoretical paradigms refer to a state of broad theoretical consensus where competing 
logics and regimes agree to an all-encompassing idea of the time. For instance, unlike Cold War era 
capitalist-communist dichotomy, post-Cold War period has witnessed unprecedented rise of market-
based systems capable of initiating greater convergence of differing perspectives and paradigms 
across countries.     
2 The concept of a paradigm, whose originator, T.S. Kuhn was inspired by the history of the national 
sciences, is applied to the context of the social sciences. Here the new paradigm does not necessarily 
mean to replace the old; several paradigms may function effectively side-by-side. Scholars can be said 
to use the same paradigm in their research and teaching if they show the following common attributes: 
1) They work to solve the same or closely related ‘puzzles’. They view social reality from the same, 
or almost the same angle. They set out to illuminate the same, or almost the same range of phenomena, 
and are content to abstract away the same phenomena or leave them obscure. Those who work within 
a common paradigm have the same, or a closely related outlook, viewpoint and approach. 2) They use 
conceptual frameworks that are the same or closely akin. (Alternatively, it is relatively easy to 
compile a word list that translates the conceptual apparatus of one author into that of another.) 3) 
They use the same or a similar methodology for observing, processing experience and drawing 
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extent of economic change between 1820 and 1913 was both unprecedented and impressive: per 
capita income in the average OECD country more than tripled; the share of industry rose 
dramatically; the share of employment in agriculture declined by two thirds; the volume of 
world exports grew more than thirty fold; a global economy and a global financial system were 
created; substantial intercontinental capital and population movements took place, connecting 
the overseas territories to the European economy; and international patterns of specialization in 
production and trade emerged (Adelman, 1995). Nonetheless, the first LIEO could not sustain 
its momentum due to its direct linkages with the colonial political economy and thus fell 
apart under the multiple pressures originating from the imperial rivalry. Finally, the 
disrupting impact from WW I, Great Depression and WW II put to an effective end to the 
first experiment of LIEO, which derived its rationale from the free trade doctrine promoted 
by neo-classical economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The prevailing political 
sentiments that emerged out of interwar period gave birth to new economic ideas limiting 
free trade and capital mobility and generally using the power of government to strongly 
regulate and guide economic activity. A central lesson drawn from the experience of the 
decades between the world wars was that the economic and political fate of the world could 
not be safely entrusted to the unregulated free market forces. History warned that this was a 
path to economic instability, global depression and political chaos. 
The outbreak of the Cold War, based on the capitalist-socialist ideological confrontation, 
led to the primacy of politics over economics. Soviet Union’s resilience to Great Depression 
attracted many developing economies towards state-led planned development. Many newly 
independent countries created a plan-rational ‘developmental state’ to augment economic 
growth.4
A new economic dynamics begins with the end of Cold War era capitalist-socialist 
dichotomy when mainstream economic thinking started to converge around the ‘Washington 
 A ‘Keynesian revolution’ swept across the globe justifying activist role of state in 
the market place. Big governments and Keynesian macro-economic management in the 
North and the rise of ‘developmental state’ in the South characterized the early Post-WW II 
period. However, the economic instability that erupted in the 1970s created a powerful 
movement, led by business and, particularly, financial interests to roll back the economic 
regulatory power of state, replacing conscious societal control with the ‘invisible hand’ of 
unregulated markets. 
                                                          
conclusions; they support their statements by the same or similar methods. Unlike many other 
paradigms in the natural or social sciences, here we refer to the system paradigm, which cannot be 
linked with a single great name, a great innovative figure who fomented a scientific revolution. It 
developed in a series of works, over a long period. For details, see T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, [1962] 1970. 
3 The period 1820-1913 was one of very free international trade, with no quantitative restrictions and 
with mostly low or no tariffs on raw material and food imports, varying degrees of industrial 
protection, extremely free international movements of labor and capital, and a fixed nominal exchange 
rate under a gold-sterling-standard. For details, see Irma Adelman, “The Long Term Impact of 
Economic Development in Developed Countries on Developing Countries since 1820” Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1995), pp. 189-208. 
4 For details about the developmental state, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: 
The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford University Press, 1982); and A. Leftwich, 
“Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State”, Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1995), pp. 400-27. 




Consensus’ and its mentor the neo-liberal theoretical paradigm.5 Keynesian economics gave 
way to the monetarist thought. This paradigm shift signals the second coming of LIEO, 
which once again initiated a paradigmatic convergence. The dynamic impact of converging 
paradigms around neo-liberalism has virtually created a borderless global economy where 
regimes of economic cooperation (RECs)6
The global economy powered by the CTPs provides a great impetus to the RECs. The 
globalization and regionalization processes emanating from the CTPs are virtually forcing 
national economies to extend hands of cooperation globally. India and Korea are two such 
cases where growing convergence in their economic thinking leading to market-based 
consensus reflects a crucial turn around in their bilateral economic cooperation. The power 
of CTPs is cutting across many of the rules set by traditional geo-economic or geo-political 
arrangements and creating a set of incentives for the economies to enter into bilateral/ 
multilateral cooperation regimes such as free trade agreements (FTAs), Custom Unions, 
Common Markets and Monetary Unions, etc.    
 have witnessed a fundamental transformation. In 
Europe, Latin America, and Asia, regional economic agreements have become a dominant 
expression of relations among states, giving regional structures a geopolitical personality. 
Clearly, national economies are submerging into regional economies spearheaded by 
NAFTA, EC, ASEAN and MERCOSUR. These regional cooperation regimes are linked 
with the CTPs pushing to a globally integrated economic regime.  
Ideas and arguments in this paper are organized in the following way. Section II revisits a 
historical legacy by assessing the impact of diverging paradigms – capitalism vs. socialism 
and Keynesianism vs. monetarism – on the RECs. It argues that differing economic 
paradigms create distinct regulatory structures affecting global/regional governance in the 
areas of finance, trade and market. These differing frameworks effectively hinder the process 
of economic cooperation. It notes how regulatory mismatch of the earlier era was further 
complicated by the superpower ideological rivalry played out on the politico-military turf. 
The Cold War period symbolizes the power of paradigm clash, which clearly fragmented 
global trade, finance, market regimes and associated cooperative economic structures created 
by the first LIEO.  
Section III takes note of growing paradigmatic convergence in the post-Cold War era 
when capitalist-socialist dichotomy dramatically has given way to the primacy of market 
                                                          
5  J. Aziz, and R. F. Wescott, “Policy Complementarities and the Washington Consensus,” IMF 
Working Paper 97/118. Washington, D.C., 1997.  
6 Apart from the various structures of bilateral economic interaction, RECs includes; regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), Free Trade Agreement (FTAs), Custom Union, Common Markets, Economic 
Unions. RTAs are agreements whereby members accord preferential treatment to one another in 
respect of trade barriers. RTAs vary in terms of the level of integration. At the base is the FTA where 
trade barriers (usually tariffs) between partner countries are abolished. However, each member 
determines its own external trade barrier with non-FTA members independently. A prominent 
example of an FTA is the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The next level of 
integration is the Custom Union where a common external trade policy (e.g. common external tariff 
regime) is adopted by member countries. MERCOSUR represents such an arrangement. Common 
Markets like the European Community adopt further provisions to facilitate the free movement of 
factors of production like labor and capital, and the harmonization of trading and technical standards 
across member countries. Finally, Economic Unions such as the European Union, extend the 
harmonization to fiscal and monetary policies, as well as social and legal policies.  
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logic and assesses its impact on the RECs. It argues that the end of communism unleashed 
powerful forces of market capable of creating a truly global space in terms of finance, trade, 
and production. The market revolution, powered by the ‘Washington consensus,’ clearly 
integrated traditionally segmented national economies into an evolving borderless global 
economy. It notes that this phase can be termed as the second LIEO. Section IV provides the 
evidence from the bilateral economic interaction between India and Korea where two distinct 
phases – paradigm divergence and paradigm convergence – are clearly visible. The Indo-
Korean bilateral trade data consisting of export and import figures and investment patterns 
validates the basic assumptions set forth in this paper that paradigmatic divergence 
prominent during the Cold War period reduces bilateral economic interaction and 
paradigmatic convergence of post-Cold War increases bilateral economic cooperation. 
Section V derives policy lessons from the CTPs deeply affecting RECs. It outlines an 
institutional cooperation framework that can facilitate/protect qualitative upgradation in the 
bilateral economic cooperation and create vital linkages to the RECs. It also highlights the 
point that Indo-Korean bilateral RECs has the potential to become the backbone for future 
regional economic cooperation framework that can move in steps from bilateral free trade 
agreement to multilateral Custom Union, Common Market and finally Economic Union of 
Asian countries.  
Section VI concludes that the economics of paradigm convergence positively affect the 
RECs. It confirms that during the Cold War period, Indo-Korean economic cooperation was 
marred by the paradigmatic divergence when Korea experimented capitalist accumulation 
logic based on the export-promotion, private sector-led economic regime and India adopted 
socialist distributive logic based on import-substitution, public sector-led economic regime. 
In the post-1990s, both India and Korea have increasingly witnessed a paradigm convergence 
leading to the liberal economic ideas in both countries. This liberal economic regime has 
been the prime mover of substantially increased bilateral economic cooperation under 
market-seeking and production-seeking approaches. In the 2000s, it confirms that the 
dominance of managerial logic in the corporate decision making, and therefore incased signs 
clustering of Korean business in India. These emerging Korean business clusters have 
activated mid-level Korean entrepreneurs who are eager to follow the Chaebol’s road to 
success to India. 
The growing calls for protecting jobs and domestic industries are putting multiple 
pressures on the second LIEO. This situation may yet again lead to paradigmatic divergence, 
therefore it is reasonable to limit the time frame of this study prior to global financial crisis 
of 2007.  
 
 
2. ECONOMICS OF DIVERGING THEORETICAL PARADIGMS 
Cold War Era Capitalist-Socialist Dichotomy and the Fragmentation of Old RECs  
 
The end of the first LIEO marks the beginning of a confrontational era when economic 
paradigms diverged sharply. In this period, the growing dichotomy between capitalism and 
socialism led to the unprecedented paradigm clash, leading to the fragmentation of earlier era 
RECs.7
                                                          
7 Socialist relations refer to the trends toward making political, associational, and contractual activity a 
balance against, or an adversarial alternative to, or a means of redefining, property ownership, in such 
 The paradigmatic divergence, created by conflicting capitalist and socialist doctrines, 




was further complicated by the ensuing ideological rivalry played on the politico-military 
sphere between the United States and Soviet Union. For the first time in the world, economic 
ideas created their politico-military domains bitterly contested in the global scale. These 
competing ideological frameworks divided countries and continents into antagonistic 
ideological blocs with minimal economic interaction. The power of paradigm clash raised the 
‘iron curtain’ dividing Europe into two distinct paradigms: capitalism in the West and 
socialism in the East. The ‘Berlin Wall’ not only symbolized the division of Germany but the 
power of economic ideas to divide and fragment RECs. By effectively blocking the 
movements of goods, people, and capital, paradigmatic divergence put East-West European 
economic cooperation to a stand still.       
Furthermore, within the capitalist bloc, Keynesian and monetarist paradigms, which gave 
differing emphasis to the role of state in the market place, considerably affected the scope 
and depth of economic cooperation.8
Thus, the paradigmatic divergence between capitalism-socialism and Keynesianism-
Monetarism deeply affected economic linkages between regions and countries. Twentieth 
century’s great paradigm-clash destroyed the very foundation of RECs, where ideologically 
opposed economies chose not to interact. Apart from politico-military considerations, 
disruption in trade and investment between rival blocs was further aggravated due to the 
mismatched regulatory structures governing financial, managerial and trade related issues. A 
closer scrutiny of these regulatory structures confirms that trade and investment flows 
generally follow well-established channels and networks based on the harmonious regulatory 
structures.   
 The Keynesian management of ‘market aggregates’ led 
to the friction in bilateral trade and investment affecting RECs. Trade and investment 
frictions of the 1980s between the economies of East Asia and USA and recent trans-Atlantic 
trade rifts remind the differences in the economic philosophies guiding their trade, 
investment and market opening initiatives.          
 
2.1. Financial Regulatory Structures  
 
The RECs largely derive their functional efficiency and long-term sustainability from the 
market defined regulatory structures of finance. Deregulated financial markets facilitate cross 
border capital flows. Market-determined exchange rate regimes, well functioning stock 
markets, private banking sector, and an efficient international capital market – all are 
                                                          
ways especially as to make the market socially accountable and socially responsible. It has involved 
political, social, and economic reordering in the direction of regulating, modifying, remedying, or 
displacing, market behavior and market outcomes by social policy. Socialism, therefore, has 
corresponded with social relations, law, public policy, standards, and values asserting a broadening 
conception of human rights reshaping and redefining property rights and market behavior. In capitalist 
relations, principles of liberty and efficiency (often referred to as “bourgeois”) tend in some decisive 
ways to broaden the sphere of individual initiative and authority as well as equalitarian values and 
behavior, but they tend at the same time, on behalf of concurrent principles of property rights and 
economic development, to range themselves against emergent, ever broader standards of liberty, 
equality, social justice, and development. Also, see Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Writing 
Science). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
8  S.C. Dow and J. Hillard, eds., Keynes, Uncertainty and the Global Economy, Vol. 2, Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2002. 
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important component for the long-term viability of trade and investment flows across borders. 
On the other hand, financial regulations based on the repressed exchange rate regimes, state 
controlled banking sector, and large public sector enterprises are key deterrent to the capital 
flows. Keeping regulatory rationalization in mind, European economic union concluded 
various agreements streamlining financial regulatory structures. The Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) laid down a detailed criterion to this effect. 9
 
 In other words, matching financial 
regulations based on the market logic enhance economic cooperation and mismatching 
financial regulations based on the political logic hinders the process of economic cooperation. 
Thus, expansion of international production, distribution and marketing requires market-
based financial regulatory structures. 
2.2. Managerial Regulatory Structures 
 
Regulatory structures of management and ownership of a firm falls under the clearly 
defined two spheres: management and finance. The rise of professional managerial class has 
fundamentally changed the functioning of a firm towards greater efficiency and profitability. 
Market determined decision-making systems became the core of capitalist managerial 
philosophy. However, the managerial revolution that swept the corporate sector in the 
capitalist economies left the socialist economies untouched. In the socialist economies, the 
management of a firm has continued to be an administrative work based on the political and 
social requirements. In this management system price has always been determined by the 
political compulsions rather than market signals. These diverging managerial structures 
during the period of paradigm clash prevents firms to establish cooperative alliances and 
joint-ventures.  
 
2.3. Trade & Investment Related Regulatory Structures 
 
Various tariff and non-tariff barriers, anti-dumping duties, import quota systems are the 
potential policy instruments under the governments that can distort free flow of investment, 
commodities and manufactured goods. In the past when economies agreed to have free trade 
regimes, economic interaction among and between countries increased substantially. Under 
the GATT supervision, relatively free flow of goods, commodities and services was ensured. 
This has led to the substantial ‘trade creation’ and subsequently enhancing economic 
cooperation among trading partners. On the contrary, in the socialist economies, 
internal/external trade came under the monopoly of state and state-run enterprises, hence 
limiting the potential to trade and investment internationally. Movement of goods and 
services was restricted by the non-market structures and manned by extensive army of 
bureaucrats. Thus, sharp variation in the regulatory regimes emerged as the vital constraining 
factor to promote economic cooperation.      
These diverging regulatory structures based on competing economic paradigms created a 
regime of constraints hindering economic cooperation. Areas under the socialist influence 
zone traded under the elaborate system of political considerations and largely failed to realize 
the actual potential, whereas in the market-based system, goods and services moved 
following the price differentials and realized greater potential. Thus, economic cooperation 
in the Cold War era strictly followed the matching regulatory spheres and virtually leaving 
                                                          
9 For the further details about the 1992 treaty, see http://www.essex.ac.uk/info/Maastricht.html 




the economies under the mismatching regulatory practices under the sphere of non-
cooperation. Cold War ideological confrontation penetrated deep in the RECs and 
successfully fragmented the regimes of integration realized during the first LIEO.       
 
 
3. ECONOMICS OF CONVERSING THEORETICAL PARADIGMS 
Market Revolution, Washington Consensus, and the Rise of Borderless Global Economy  
 
With the end of the Cold War, the structures created by WW I, Great Depression, and 
WW II lost their rationale and gave way to the second coming of the LIEO. Following the 
collapse of Soviet Union and the subsequent weakening of the paradigmatic clash between 
capitalism and socialism, a powerful market revolution swept across the globe. From East 
Europe to China and from Vietnam to newly independent Baltic, economies achieved a far-
reaching transition to market.10 These historic events clearly demonstrated that the activist 
role of state in the economic management were rather damaging. In economic thinking, 
Keynesianism lost its supporters and hence the political management of the aggregates of 
demand and supply was increasingly replaced by a resurgent Monetarist philosophy. 11 
Though, in a rush to markets, neo-liberal economic reforms in Russia and to some extent in 
East Asia also brought misery to millions and raised serious questions before the rigid 
market orthodoxy. A rethinking that followed East Asian and Russian financial crisis pushed 
the ‘Washington consensus’ to move towards the ‘post-Washington consensus’.12
  
 Indeed, the 
events of the last decade of 20th century proved the inevitability of market system. This 
powerful market wave created a broad-based paradigmatic convergence, which encouraged 
national economies to upgrade economic cooperation. Globalization of production, 
distribution, market and investment has created immense possibilities for close economic 
cooperation culminating in the wave of FTAs. The economic cooperation in this era is 
clearly visible in the substantially increased intra-regional trade & investment flows, intra-
firm trade, and the hectic cross-border merger and acquisition activities.   
3.1. Intra-Regional Trade and Investment  
  
The economics of paradigmatic convergence led to the rise of geo-economic 
considerations. Notion of regional competitiveness started to acquire bigger space in the  
Table 1. Intra-regional trade as a percent of a region’s world trade 
 
 1980 1990 1999 
                                                          
10 Michael Ellman, “The Political Economy of Transformation”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
Vol. 13, No. 2 (1997), pp. 23-32; and Grzegorz Ekiert, “Democratization Processes in East Central 
Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration”, British Journal of Political Science Vol.  21 (1991), pp. 285-
313.  
11 Robert Skidelsky, ed. End of the Keynesian Era:  Essays on the Disintegration of the Keynesian 
Political Economy, London:  Macmillan, 1977.  
12 Moises Naim, “Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?” Foreign Policy, 118 (Spring 
2000), pp. 87-101; Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, 1997; and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: 
Norton, 2002.  
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European Union 57 66 61 
NAFTA 33 37 47 
MERCOSUR 13 14 22 
Andean 4 5 10 
ASEAN 14 14 18 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, various years 
 
 
policy debates than the traditional concept of national competitiveness. This trend created 
intra-regional trade and investment boom and greatly enhanced economic cooperation 
between and among the region’s economies. European Union, NAFTA, and ASEAN −  all 
witnessed sharply increased intra-regional trade and investment flows. The European Union 
transformed into a highly integrated regional trade area. As shown in the Table 1, in 1980, 57 
percent of the total merchandise trade (exports plus imports) of the European Union stayed in 
the region. This share increased to 66 percent in 1990, and then the market revolution swept 
the former Soviet bloc countries, which finally integrated itself in the expended European 
space.  
Following the trend, in 1988, Canada and the United States formed a free trade area that 
became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the inclusion of Mexico 
in 1994. As Table 1 indicates, trade among the NAFTA countries as a share of their total 
trade has risen steadily over the last two decades. Similarly, in 1991, Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay formed a free trade area MERCOSUR, which was later joined by 
Bolivia and Chile. Around the same time, the Andean group incorporating Bolivia, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela began a concerted effort to eliminate trade barriers among its 
member countries. In both areas, the share of regional trade rose sharply in the 1990s after 
showing little increase during the 1980s. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) initially consisting of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines, formed a free trade area in 1992. There was no change in the share of regional 
trade for the ASEAN countries during the 1980s; however, following the creation of the free 
trade area, the share of regional trade rose – from 14 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 1999. 
The change in the pattern of Korea’s trade also indicates that factors other than free trade 
agreements are important for increasing regional trade. Korea is not a member of a regional 
free trade area, yet the share of its trade involving other emerging East Asian countries 
increased from 10 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 1999. As with Latin America, this 
increase in intra-regional trade may have been spurred by an overall reduction in the level of 
trade barriers, as well as rising income levels in the region.  
There has been a proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) covering trade in 
goods or services worldwide in the 2000s. Compared with the 124 RTA notifications 
received by GATT (predecessor of WTO) over the 46 years from 1948-1994, in 1990s the 
WTO received more than 90 RTAs. As a result of this increase in the number of RTAs, 
preferential trade increased from 40 percent of total world trade in the period 1988-1992 to 
42 percent in the period 1993-1997.13
                                                          
13 Jean-Marie Grether and Marcelo Olarreaga, “Preferential and Non-Preferential Trade Flows in the 
World”, Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-10, September 1998, at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ 
reser_e/pera9810.doc 
 Western Europe (EU-15) had the highest proportion of 
preferential trade (70 percent), but the increase between 1988-1992 and 1993-1997 was 





The Western Hemisphere (NAFTA and MERCOSUR), on the other hand, experienced 
significant growth in the proportion of preferential trade, from 19 percent in 1988-1992 to 27 
percent in 1993-1997. In contrast, only a small proportion of the trade in the Asia Pacific 
region was preferential trade, and the share had in fact declined from 4 percent in 1988-1992 
to 3 percent in 1993-1997. This was despite the strong growth of intra- regional trade in Asia 
Pacific, which rose from 34 percent in 1985 to 48 percent in 1995.
 
15
In fact, a 1995 study by the WTO Secretariat concluded that regional and multilateral 
integration initiatives are complements rather than alternatives in the pursuit of more open 
trade. Regionalism can help in building domestic confidence by first confining market 
liberalization to member of RTA countries. Economies may be more amiable to multilateral 
trade liberalization after observing the trade creation and investments that regionalism 
induces. Regionalism would also allow group of countries to negotiate rules and 
commitments that go beyond what is possible multilaterally due to the lower bargaining 
complexities. Thus, this growth in intra-regional trade and investment is not exclusively 




3.2. Intra-Firm Trade and Investment 
 
Intra-regional trade and investment flows have received vigorous support by the growing 
intra-firm trade. Venables (1999) argues that international fragmentation of production is one 
aspect of globalization of world economy.16 This vertical disintegration can be associated to 
the development of outsourcing through inter-firm relations, leading to an increased share of 
trade in intermediate goods as described empirically by Feenstra (1998)17 and explained 
theoretically by Grossman and Helpman (2002)18
Nevertheless, even if it is difficult to measure intra-firm trade due to its nature and the 
lack of data, some studies assess its importance regarding total international trade. According 
to the UNCTAD (1996), one third of all international trade occurs within MNCs. In 1993, 
the share of intra-firm exports by parent firms based in the country and affiliates of foreign 
firms located in the country in total exports of the country ranges from 38 percent in the case 
of Sweden to 24 percent in the case of Japan. The corresponding share of intra-firm imports 
 among others. It can also be associated to a 
spatial fragmentation with activities remaining within a single firm involving 
multinationality as described by Venables (1999). The later aspect of fragmentation leads 
necessarily to the development of intra-firm trade.  
                                                          
14 For further details, see “Rise of Regionalism”, Trade Division, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
Singapore, at http://app-stg.mti.gov.sg/data/article/21/doc/NWS_Regionalism.pdf 
15 For details, see http://app-stg.mti.gov.sg/data/article/21/doc/NWS_Regionalism.pdf 
16 A. J. Venables, “Fragmentation and Multinational Production”, European Economic Review, Vol. 43, 
No. 4-6, (1999), pp. 935-945.    
17 R. C. Feenstra, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 31-50.  
18 G.M. Grossman and E. Helpman, Outsourcing in a Global Economy. Mimeo. Harvard University, 
2002.   
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in total country imports ranges from 14 percent in Japan to 43 percent in the United States.19 
Describing French data, Mathieu and Quelennec (1997) found that trade within multinational 
firm’s networks represents more than 35 percent of overall French trade. More than 23 
percent of the intra-firm exports of French firms are for use in production. 20
   
 Hence, a 
powerful trend among MNCs has been to trade with sister firms or subsidiaries. This way 
firms do not have to deal with certain unknowns in the business. Consequently, intra-firm 
trade accounts for the large part of international trade.  
3.3. Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)   
       
The multiple pressures originating from the globalization, regionalization and 
technological changes are pushing corporations to look beyond the traditional sources of 
comparative advantage. To achieve bigger scale of economies, to penetrate in crucial 
markets, and to acquire critical technologies, firms are getting frantically involved in the 
cross-border M&A activities. M&A activities testify growing economic cooperation among 
and between the involved enterprises, regions, and economies. In the year 2000, Asia alone 
accounted for US $ 231.9 billion M&A transactions. Table 2: lists the Asian M&A 
transactions that shows the growing cross-border corporate integration.  
There are diverse explanations pinpointing determinants of M&A transactions. 21
Other explanations for M&As exist. One plausible explanation is that acquirers take 
advantage of under priced assets in the acquired firm. This analysis could explain merger 
waves, since assets could become undervalued across a broad spectrum of companies. A 
more recent hypothesis is that some M&As occurs in order for management to break explicit 
or implicit contracts with labor, this ability being unavailable to incumbent managers. Apart 
from these explanations, M&A transactions suggest the cross-border firm level integration, 
which is one of the indicators of growing economic cooperation.   
 One 
clear potential determinant is inefficient management in the acquired firm, which is not 
maximizing shareholders’ returns and is thus open to a hostile takeover designed to replace 
the managers. This move is called the market for “corporate control”. Another management 
story explaining M&As is the notion that it is the managers of the acquiring firm (rather than 
of the acquired firm) who are inefficient, using their power to acquire assets. These 
acquisition-bound managers feel satisfied from driving their firms larger even when such 
acquisitions are not to the benefit of the owner shareholders. Many observers suggest that the 
conglomerate merger wave of the 1970s, a wave that eventually saw most such mergers re-
divided, was driven by ambitions of acquiring firms’ managers. 
The above-mentioned areas of intense economic interaction suggest that paradigmatic 
convergence can provide sufficient stimulus to broaden the scope, depth and nature of 
economic cooperation, however with one clear difference: the opportunities of economic 
cooperation created during the era of first LIEO were enforced by the colonial interests but  
Table 2. Cross-border Merger and Acquisition Purchases: Asia Pacific, 1990-1996 
                                                          
19 For details, see UNCTAD, World Investment Report: Investment, Trade and International Policy 
Arrangements, United Nations: New York, 1996.    
20 E. Mathieu and M. Quelennec, Industrial Establishment Abroad and Exports, DSTI/EAS/IND/SWP 
(97) 18, OECD: Paris, 1997.   
21 For details, see L. Waverman, ed., Corporate Globalization Through Mergers and Acquisitions, 
Canada: University of Calgary Press, 1991.  
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Total 6,392 226,153.71 
Source: International Labor Organization, various years 
 
 
the economic cooperation during the second LIEO is by choice, signaled by the market 
forces. This difference in the nature of forces that are pushing regimes of economic 
cooperation can explain the sustainability of present RECs, even under the growing intense 
pressure to preserve jobs and maximize exports in the current global downward spiral. 
 
 
4. ECONOMICS OF DIVERGING-CONVERGING PARADIGMS 
Evidence from Indo-Korean Bilateral Economic Cooperation  
   
The major trends in the Indo-Korean bilateral economic cooperation are clearly linked 
with the economics of diverging-converging paradigms. The trade & investment data reveals 
the fact that economic relations between India and Korea have been primarily shaped by the 
changes in the contemporary economic thinking, which has witnessed a distinct phase of 
paradigm divergence as well as of convergence. In the history of India-Korea bilateral 
economic relations, which formally began with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 
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1973, economic thinking has witnessed a sea change.22
It is important to note that the fundamental transformation in the economic thinking came 
with the three major disjunctions: one, the collapse of centrally-planned economies of 
communist block; two, end of antagonistic politics of Cold War; and three, the crisis of 
Fordist model. These developments have raised doubts before the arguments supporting the 
activist role of state in the market place. Moreover, the stunning advances in the 
technological front, particularly in the area of information & communication technologies, 
have accelerated the pace of change. The cumulative impact of forces unleashed by the wider 
convergence on freer markets paved the way for an unprecedented level of economic 
integration in the world economy. A new era of globalization and liberalization started to 
fundamentally alter the established frameworks of production, market and finance. With the 
rest of other economies, both Indian and Korean economies started to adjust with the 
changed rules of the global political economy and initiated their own liberalization & 
deregulation programs.
 In the past, theoretical paradigms 
such as capitalism vs. socialism or more recent Keynesianism vs. monetarism clearly 
diverged on structural, organizational and operational levels. However in the recent times 
there are ample evidence showing greater theoretical convergence leading towards the “Post-
Washington Consensus” (Stiglitz, 1998, 2002). This changed economic thinking has actively 
restructured the overall framework of Korea-India bilateral economic relations, which moved 
from the lows of 1960~70s to the highs of 1990~2000s. 
23
Furthermore, the removal of dividing wall in Europe, erected by the Cold War 
superpower rivalry, led to a major realignment in the geo-economic sphere. Regional trade 
alliances came into fore with Europe leading the charge.
 
24  Following this general geo-
economic trend, Asia too witnessed a substantial rise in the intra-Asian trade and investment 
flows. This explicit rise in the geo-economic considerations affected broader parameters, 
arguments and policies under which bilateral relations between Korea-India were operating 
in the past.25
Accompanying these broader trends, on the micro level, the loss of India’s traditional 
trade partners following the collapse of Soviet Union made it imperative for India to reorient 
its external trade. Meanwhile, Korea too witnessed growing trade friction with the important 
trading partners such as the US and the EC and felt the compelling need to diversify its 
export market. Hence, with the easing of Cold War super power rivalry, Korea initiated a 
well-thought policy, popularly known as “nordpolitik”, to improve relations with the former 
  
                                                          
22 After 11 years of consular relations, India and Korea formally established diplomatic relations in 
December 1973.   
23 India initiated structural adjustment program in 1991 which effectively integrated Indian economy to 
the global economy. Similarly, Korea’s half-heartedly initiated economic reforms got powerful boost 
after the 1997 financial crisis.  
24 Euro came into existence in the year 1999 when it was launched as an accounting currency. In the 
year 2002, banknotes and coins of the currency were introduced in the European Union countries with 
certain conditions to be complied with if any country wants to use the currency parallel to the 
domestic currency. By launching Euro, countries of the European Union created the firm basis to 
regional integration.  
25 Roh Tae-woo administration launched ‘nordpolitik’ to reach out to former communist countries, 
similarly Indian Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao initiated “Look East Policy” to engage 
economically rising economies of East and Southeast Asia.     




communist countries and India articulated “Look East” policy to strike a new balance in its 
dealing with the regions of East and West.  
In the beginning of 1990s changed political economic thinking started to affect economic 
policies and corporate sector’s long-term investment decisions. Reflecting the new thinking, 
Indo-Korean economic relations moved away from the short-term ‘market-seeking approach’ 
followed during the 1960s and 1970s to the long-term ‘production-seeking approach’ 
initiated during the 1990s, and then cluster-seeking approach in the 2000s.26
To fully understand the economics of converging paradigms, it is also important to 
briefly review the phase of diverging paradigms, which created structures of constraints 
under which economic interaction between Korea and India was almost stagnated. Thus, the 
first part of this section discusses the period – 1960s to 1980s – largely dominated by the 
Cold War era political logic based on diverging paradigms. During this period, both Korea 
and India were ideologically aligned with the competing superpower blocs where political 
calculations dominated over the hard economic realities. This left only a narrow space for the 
bilateral economic cooperation between two countries. As a close ally of a rival superpower, 
Korea half-heartedly sought market access in India with symbolic investment. This low-key 
economic interaction can be termed as “constrained cooperation”.  
 Korea started to 
view India not only as long-term market destination but an important base for overseas 
production that can infuse new blood in the declining combativeness of its fledgling export 
industries. Korea’s big business, namely Chaebol, started building large production facilities 
in India to produce automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, TVs, 
computers, and mobile phones, etc.     
The second part of this section analyzes post-Cold War period after 1990s when state 
“roll back” was already engineered with market forces actively shaping the economic 
outcomes around the world. This was the time when economies of former communist 
countries, termed as transition economies, initiated experimenting with either ‘shock 
therapy’ or ‘gradualist approach’ to adopt market-based systems. By acknowledging this 
general trend towards market-based systems, India too initiated a far-reaching economic 
liberalization program aimed at integrating Indian economy with the global economy. 
Keeping track of Indian developments, Korea in this phase targeted India as one of the 
destinations to establish production bases to carter domestic as well as overseas market 
demand. This new approach resulted in the sudden jump of Korea’s FDI to India. The 
economic cooperation under this phase has been termed as “unconstrained cooperation”.  
The third part of this section examines the period after 2000s when market-based system 
engulfed most of the economies in the world. During this phase, global economy recorded 
remarkable growth and positively stimulated various regimes of economic cooperation. 
Managerial concerns to efficiently manage overseas investment, production, and market took 
the center stage. India-Korea economic cooperation is not exception of this general trend. 
This new concern expressed in form of industrial clusters where Korean corporations 
initiated to consolidate their position in the Indian market space. Bilateral economic 
cooperation under this phase has been termed as a “take off phase”.   
        
 
 
                                                          
26 For details, see Jitendra Uttam, “Economic Relations between India and Korea” in edited volume 
“Thirty Years of Korea-India Relations” (Seoul: Shingu Publishing Co. 2003), pp. 106-136.  
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4.1. Dominance of Political Logic:  
Constrained Cooperation under the Market-seeking Approach, 1960s~1980s   
 
In this phase, Indo-Korean bilateral economic interaction was effectively constrained by 
the primacy of political logic emanating from the Cold War ideological rivalry. The two 
newly independent Asian countries, India and Korea were sucked into the vortex of Cold 
War era global politico-military antagonism. To a certain degree, both countries were aligned 
to rival super power camps with distinctly different economic focus: re-distribution under the 
socialist, public sector dominated economy in case of India and accumulation under the 
capitalist, private sector dominated economy in case of Korea. These two distinct approaches 
to development altered state capacity to create or recreate state, society and market relations 
which created new type of economic actors that aspired for the differing goals. India’s 
dominant public sector units, operating under the strict import-substitution industrial strategy, 
were concerned only with the protected domestic market but Korea’s diversified business 
conglomerates, often known as Chaebol, had to perform in the framework of export 
promotion industrial strategy, thus open to face the competitive pressures from the global 
market place. Moreover, the political economy of Cold War and the subsequent rise of US-
led ‘alliance system’ created a distinct dynamics that provided Korea a clear advantage in 
penetrating the Western markets, and access to cutting-edge manufacturing technologies. On 
the other hand, India’s close proximity with Soviet Union and its import-substitution strategy 
led to disconnect with the capitalist market space which resulted in a painfully slow growth 
rate during 1960s-1970s. This paradigmatic divide led to insignificant economic interaction 
between Korea and India.    
It is well known that from the mid-1960s, Korean economy started to feel the dynamic 
impact of export-led industrialization strategy, whereas Indian economy came under the 
burden of import substitution industrial policies. This divergence in the policy dynamics of 
both economies resulted in the symbolism than substance in the bilateral economic 
interaction. In 1964, India and Korea signed their first trade agreement, though it did help in 
initiating the two-way trade but could not lead to any substantial increase in the bilateral 
trade. Thus, even seven years after the agreement in 1971, the two-way trade was merely US 
$12.4 million. Table 3 confirms nominal economic interaction between the two countries in 
the most part of the 1970s.   
The establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Korea in 1973 marks the 
watershed in the history of bilateral economic cooperation; however it could not break the 
lingering impasse generated by diverging paradigms. In order to facilitate bilateral trade, just 
a year after the formal diplomatic relations, both governments agreed to accord each other 
the Most Favored Nations (MFN) status, which became the guiding framework for bilateral 
economic relations. With the established set of rules defined by the 1974 Agreement,27
Table 3. Korea’s Export-Import to India, 1973~1980 
 
bilateral trade between India and Korea witnessed a relative increase. It increased to US $170 
                                                          
27  In this agreement items available for export and imports were identified and it was sought to 
maximize trade between the two countries in these items. It was also specified that the goods and 
commodities exchanged between the two countries should be given the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
treatment with respect to taxes and duties to be levied. Similarly, the agreement also sought to 
encourage technical cooperation between the two countries on the basis of exchange of technical 
know-how, skilled personnel etc.    





Year Export Inc. Rate Import Inc. Rate 
1973 3 -72.3 12 173.1 
1974 5 79.1 22 88.2 
1975 7 43.7 39 76.6 
1976 11 73.1 34 -13.0 
1977 21 79.3 23 -31.8 
1978 78 227.8 39 69.9 
1979 87 11.9 83 111.4 
1980 173 99.0 54 -35.5 
Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA), 2003 
 
 
million in 1979. One of the reasons cited for this increase was probably the renewed 
agreement of 1974 that replaced the 1964 Agreement (Bhaumik, 1989: 64). 28
In the 1980s, India’s half-hearted, poorly conceptualize economic liberalization program 
under the Rajiv Gandhi administration led to a severe balance of payment crisis in 1989. This 
was further aggravated by the ensuing troubles in the communist bloc. In the mean time, 
Korea witnessed rapid economic expansion and was famously termed as the “Miracle on the 
Han River.”
 This was the 
time when Korea’s record of success in the export-oriented industrial sector started to gain 
momentum. Rapidly expanding exports pushed nation’s corporate sector to look for newer 
markets, and India having second largest population in the world was certainly a probable 
market. Between 1971-80 while India’s exports to Korea increased at the annual rate of 20.8 
percent but Korea’s exports to India increased at the rate of 60.1 percent. Further, in 1980s 
India’s exports to Korea declined by 35.6 percent to US $53.7 million, but Korea’s exports to 
India increased by 99 percent to US $172.9 million (KITA 2003). Thus, by the end of 1970s, 
the basic bilateral trade framework between Korea and India was established but the 
paradigm divergence remained a stumbling bloc. 
29
Table 4. Bilateral Trade between India and Korea 
 Korean economy grew at the phenomenal pace and started to diversify from 
the labor-intensive industries to heavy and chemical industries. Korea’s rapid 
industrialization gave birth to a capitalist firm ‘Chaebol’ which became the center of 
diversified, family-owned business conglomeration strategy. During this period, bilateral 
trade saw many fluctuations. It began to weaken even before it could take any significant 
shape. The two way trade reached to its peak in 1984, when it reached US $1.4 billion or 2.3 
percent of Korea’s two way trade, but then it began to decline and in 1987 it was only US 
$606 million or about 0.7 percent of Korea’s total trade. In the mean time, between 1982 and  
                                                          
28 T.K Bhaumik, “Indo-Korean Economic Linkages: A Critical Overview,” in R.C Sharma, ed., Korea, 
India and the Third World, Rajesh Publications: New Delhi, 1989, pp. 62.    
29 Korea expanded by an average of more than 8 percent per year, from US$3.3 billion in 1962 to 
US$204 billion in 1989, breaking the trillion dollar mark in 2007. Per capita annual income grew from 
US$87 in 1962 to US$4,830 in 1989, reaching the $20,000 milestone in 2007. The manufacturing 
sector grew from 14.3 percent of the GNP in 1962 to 30.3 percent in 1987. Commodity trade volume 
rose from US$480 million in 1962 to a projected US$127.9 billion in 1990. The ratio of domestic 
savings to GNP grew from 3.3 percent in 1962 to 35.8 percent in 1989. For details, see Juergen 
Kleiner, Korea: A Century of Change (World Scientific Publisher, 2001). 
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(in million US $) 
Year Total Trade Export Imports 
1981 310 225 85 
1982 499 350 149 
1983 858 577 301 
1984 1,429 1,049 380 
1985 683 467 216 
1986 639 512 127 
1987 606 404 202 
1988 635 465 170 
1989 932 675 258 
1990 718 435 283 
Source: Office of Customs Administration, Republic of Korea. 
 
 
1985 Korea succeeded in entering into a few joint-ventures in India. Between 1982 and 1987 
a total of 39 Indo-Korean collaborations were approved, of which 30 were technical 
collaborations, 5 were financial and 4 were for drawing and designs (Bhaumik, 1989: 77).30
To support, sustain and expand trade, investment and joint-ventures both countries agreed 
to enhance institutional mechanism. Apart from the Joint Trade Committee (JTC)
 
Table 4 shows the trend in the bilateral trade between Korea and India during the 1980s. 
31
The collapse of centrally-planned economies of the communist bloc and the subsequent 
end of Cold War effectively tilted the balance of economic debate in favor of market-based 
systems with neo-liberal economic paradigm at the forefront. India initiated a comprehensive 
structural reform program in 1991 and Korean government launched massive globalization 
campaign ‘segaewha’ and initiated ambitious financial liberalization program. Both 
economies moved towards market-led system based on converging theoretical paradigms. 
This new convergence in economic thinking has thrown open numerous possibilities for 
investment, trade, and production.  
 at the 
official level, there were two separate forums for brining greater coordination and interaction 
between the business communities of the two countries, namely the Korea-India Economic 
Cooperation Committee with the Confederation of Indian Engineering Industries (CEI) as the 
nodal agency and the Indo-Korean Joint Business Council (JBC) with the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) as the nodal agency. Discussions at 
business level are held annually in both these forums. 
With the end of the Cold War era paradigmatic divergence, an important impediment to 
improve India-Korea relations was removed. In the changed context, India and Korea 
discovered that they had a shared perspective on wide ranging international economic and 
strategic issues. It became evident that in the economic sphere, India and Korea could work 
more closely in organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and, more importantly, the 
                                                          
30 Ibid, p. 77. 
31 The third meeting of the JTC was held in New Delhi, India on 9 May 2000. The Indian delegation 
was led by Murasoli Maran, Minister of Commerce & Industry and the Korean delegation by Dr. Han 
Duk Soo, Minister of Trade. The Ministers reviewed bilateral economic relations, agreed to expand 
trade, accelerate Korean investment and strengthen relations in information technology and other 
areas.   




WTO. Also, sub-continental size of the Indian economy had added incentives in terms of 
vast market and cheaper production-base to the large Korean business conglomerates. At the 
strategic level, India and Korea ought to have a shared view on the emerging balance of 
power in Asia. 32
These mutually beneficial perceptions were highlighted by high-level exchanges between 
the two countries.
 Both countries would like to see a larger role for themselves in the 
assurance of Asian security, co-operating with the United States, China, Russia, Japan and 
the ASEAN member countries. India and Korea would jointly propose reforms in the global 
financial architecture to enable the IMF to deal more effectively with global financial crises. 
Equally, they had a common stake in ensuring a more transparent functioning of the WTO. A 
unified Korea would be a major power in Asia with which India could cooperate to ensure 
peace, security and economic development in Asia. 
33
   
 In less than two years after being elected to the office of the Prime 
Minister and in the immediate wake of announcement of major economic reforms, P.V. 
Narasimha Rao paid an official visit to Korea in September 1993; in fact, the first-ever visit 
by any Indian prime minister to Korea. Hailed by scholars and media in both countries as a 
significant milestone in the evolution of Korea’s deepening of relations with India, the logic 
and timing of Prime Minister Rao’s visit to Seoul underscored the recognition by the both 
sides of the imperativeness and inevitability of fostering purposive economic relations. The 
loss of its trade partner following the collapse of Soviet Union made it urgent for India to 
reorient its external trade, whereas at the same time Korea’s dependence on the US market 
and subsequent trade frictions created the need to diversify export market. These positive 
developments were reinforced by the elimination of nagging paradigmatic discord. Now, the 
stage was set for a great leap forward in the bilateral economic interaction. Second part of 
this section delves into the period (1990s ~2000s) when economics of paradigm convergence 
becomes operative and starts to shape economic relations. This leads to a new era of 
‘unconstrained cooperation’ between Korea and India. 
4.2. Dominance of Economic Logic: Unconstrained Cooperation under the 
Production-seeking Phase, 1990s~early-2000s  
 
With the arrival of 1990s, the pendulum of economic thinking swings away from the 
primacy of ‘political logic’ to ‘economic logic’. The failure of communism as a viable 
economic ideology provided momentum to the market-based economic regimes around the 
world. A term ‘transition economy’ was coined to broadly explain the general rush to adopt 
market system in the former communist economies. Keeping pace with the trend, the 
                                                          
32 Though the rise of China has initiated fundamental changes in the balance power in East Asia, 
however by following ‘Chindia Strategy’, Korea is trying to walk a fine line between the two Asian 
giants.   
33 As far back as 1983, P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Seoul as India’s Minister of External Affairs. In the 
same year, Korea’s president Chun Doo Hwan was scheduled to visit New Delhi, which subsequently 
was shelved due to terrorist attack in Myanmar. In March 1986, Korean Prime Minister Lho Shinyong 
visited India. In the beginning of 1990s, high-level interaction intensified. Korea’s Foreign Minister 
Choi Ho Joong visited in 1990 followed by the speaker of national assembly Park Hyun-Kyu in 1991. 
In 1992, India’s Foreign Minister Madhav Singh Solanki paid an official visit to Seoul. In the same 
year both countries set up a policy coordinating committee to hold periodic consultations on bilateral 
and regional issues.      
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Government of India (GOI) in 1991, initiated a comprehensive structural economic reform 
program aimed at installing a liberal economic regime.34
What is more, the evolving political climate in Korea also augured well. It was exactly 
two years before Rao’s official visit to Seoul, Korea became a member of the United 
Nations.
 The GOI has placed before the 
Parliament on July 24, 1991 a Statement on Industrial Policy with the major objectives of 
removing the bottlenecks in obtaining various approvals by entrepreneurs in making, foreign 
investment policy more attractive and in doing away with the detailed examination by 
various agencies. A major component of these changes consist of a much greater degree of 
openness to foreign investment and foreign technology agreements, compared to the past. By 
acknowledging the fundamental realignment in economic thinking, the Government of Korea 
(GOK) also framed a new economic agenda centered on financial system’s deregulation and 
liberalization. In the early 1990s, GOK embarked on a program of financial liberalization. 
35 And in the following year, Korea held free and fair elections and returned for the 
first time in the three decades a civilian president to head the state. Against these new 
realities in the Korean peninsula, together with far-reaching reforms taking place in the entire 
Asia-Pacific region, Rao’s journey to Korea was as much politically significant as it was an 
investment in the future with India’s avowed interest in seeking a foothold in the APEC. 
While media report suggested that Prime Minister Rao’s visit made a significant impression 
on the Korean government and the business community, admittedly, it signaled the ushering 
in an era of developing a wide ranging cooperative relationship between the two countries. In 
unequivocal terms, Prime Minister Rao underlined the main objective of his visit: “The 
Common elements in our positions and approaches to the changing international situation, 
particularly in Asia, provide many opportunities …to work together for our mutual benefit. A 
strong and diversified bilateral relationship between us is also an important and positive 
factor in the Asia-Pacific region”.36
Prime Minister Rao’s appeal to the Korean government and the business community 
produced the desired results. It appeared as though they were waiting for such an open 
invitation. For, the very following year, two high-powered technical delegations visited India 
- one, sponsored by official Korea and the other, a chaebol sponsored delegation represented 
by the Samsung group. The other, led by Tae Hyuk Hahm, a high-placed economist of the 
Korean Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) under the ministry of 
foreign affairs, an eleven-member delegation comprising of senior officials of the 
government visited New Delhi in May 1995 and exchanged views with several members of 
the Union Council of Ministers, officials of the different ministries and the Prime Minister. 
The range of this discussion was at the same wide and in-depth, including aspects of 
cooperation in science and technology, utilization of Economic Development Cooperation 
 
                                                          
34 For the latest details about Indian economic reforms, see Anne O. Krueger. ed., Economic Policy 
Reforms and the Indian Economy, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
35 In 1981, India pioneered its support for the admission of both Koreas - North and South - to the 
United Nations thereby creating a favorable climate both in G-77 and NAM for other members to join. 
And, at the UN General Assembly in 1991, India initiated the proposal seeking admission of both 
Koreas. Recently, India supported South Korea's candidacy for the post of deputy director general of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Also, India voted in favor of South Korea in its bid to become 
a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.     
36 Yasmin Javeri Krishan, “Korea-India Economic Relations”, Asia Prashant (Varanasi), Vol. 2, No. 2 
(1995), p. 87.  




Fund (EDCF), and trilateral cooperation among Korea, India and other countries of the South 
and South East Asian region. Echoing the suggestion made by Prime Minister Rao in Seoul 
the previous year, Hahm pointed out that low labor costs together with the large reservoir of 
technically qualified people in India could be combined with the sophisticated and labor-
intensive technologies from Korea. In respect of the tie-ups between the two countries, he 
identified particularly such complementary sectors as software development and textile to 
carter the needs of the global market place.37
In less than three months, the Samsung sponsored delegation visited India to survey and 
assess the Indian market for investment opportunities. In its report Samsung delegation 
pointed out the built-in advantages for Korean direct investments such as; 1) large reserve of 
skilled and easily trainable human resource; 2) low labor cost and cost-effective production 
process; 3) an increasing large market for industrial products with an estimated consumer 
base of 250 million people; 4) rapid pace of development requiring capital investment for 
facilities and equipment; 5) the geographic location of India proximate other South Asian 
markets; and 6) Korean investments in India could distribute investors’ risk by diversifying 
the sourcing between Indonesia, China, Philippines, Malaysia and India. 
  
The finding of theses delegations were revealing for the prospective Korean investors, 
and in process triggered further discussions between the two countries. No wonder therefore 
when the President of Korea Kim Young Sam paid an official visit to India in February 1996, 
among others, he gave priority to two vital agreements with India. One was the Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement between the two countries and the other was the setting 
up of a joint commission led by the respective foreign ministers of Korea and India to meet 
once a year.38 While no protocol was signed, the meeting between two ministers of India and 
Korea in charge of trade and commerce − Park Jae-yoon and P. Chidambaram discussed 
issues relating to the lowering of the tariffs and customs on the import of made in Korea 
consumer items. In an effort to bridge the ever-widening trade balance between the two 
countries the ministers also explored the potential of enhancing India’s export basket to 
include locally produced farm products particularly tropical fruits.39
Admittedly, President Kim Young Sam’s visit to India not only heralded a new phase in 
the evolving relations between Korea and India but, more than that, underscored the vital 
significance of the vast Indian market for the critical needs of the Korean economy. In fact 
over the last two decades, especially since Korea adopted the export promotion strategy for 
its economic development, there has been a discernable shift in Korea’s overseas investment 
which has been concentrating more on Southeast Asia following its earlier focus on US, 
European Community and Japan. Of late, given the rising labor costs in the ASEAN 
countries together with region’s economic resurgence, Korean overseas investments has bee 
seeking fresh and fertile new pastures. The obvious and immediate choice was the proximate 
China. Korea invested quite heavily in China but there remains a political concern to 
concentrate too much on the Chinese market. It is against this background Korea started to 
take seriously a much more diversified approach – balancing between India and China, i.e. 
   
                                                          
37 “Korean Economic Delegation Visits India”, Korean News (New Delhi), Vol. 22, No. 3, May-June 
1994, pp. 8-9. 
38 “India and the Republic of Korea: Strengthening the Bonds of Cooperation and Friendship through 
Economic Reforms and Globalization”, Facts for You (New Delhi), Vol. 17, No. 9, March 1996, p. 34.   
39 “Korea-India Agree to Boost Ties, Trade”, Korea News Review (Seoul), Vol. 25, No. 9 (March 1996), 
p. 7.    
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Chindia strategy. It signaled Korea’s surging interest in the Indian sub-continent. As one 
Indian national news paper in its editorial aptly commented: “Even as the Japanese kept 
studying Indian economic reforms and the European worried about the political uncertainty, 
South Korean business [have] decided, with their characteristic risk-preference, to first 
plunge and then learn to swim in the Indian market.”40
Mutual economic gains apart, Korea’s meteoric accent in the international stature − 
having assumed the second high office in the newly set-up WTO, achieving the coveted 
OECD status, and above all, the diplomatic edge it has secured in the unification process of 
the divided Korea following the end of Cold War together with decisive economic clout in 
the Asia-Pacific region − all of which have apparently persuaded India to forge close 
relations with Korea, more so with its well articulated aspirations to seek a place in the UN 
Security Council as well as in the APEC.  
 
It should be noted that initially Korea’s FDI was driven by a strategy for stable 
procurement of essential raw materials including crude oil, wood and coal during the early 
1980s. Then Korean investors began venturing into foreign countries to sharpen their 
competitive edge that was softened by an appreciating domestic wage rates as well as by the 
increasing trade friction with the industrially advanced countries of the European Union and 
the US. Emerging regional trade blocs too added difficulties to the flow of Korean overseas 
investment. It is in these circumstances, Korea’s FDI shifted to ASEAN and China especially 
in the labor-intensive manufacturing sectors. Against the huge flow of Korean capital 
investment overseas, India’s share by all reckoning was only marginal during the most of 
1990s. According to Bank of Korea, total actual investment in India as of mid-1994 stood at 
US $9,496,000 distributed into about 30 projects. Table 5-A and 5-B show the actual size of 
investment done by Korean enterprises in India during the 1982-94.  
 
Table 5-A. Korean Investment in India, 1983-1992 
 





As on June 30, 1994 
Unit: US $ 1,000 
 Approved Equity    Amount  
LVT. & Dong In Pvt.  
Daeshin Denken (India)  
Chanamama Toytronyx  
Disco Stone Indo Ltd. 
Hyundai Indo Stone   
Jark Needle Mfg. Co. 
Indo-Korea Granite  
Samwoo-Vasavi Swabs   
Cheil Indoa Wool Text  
Fishing Falcons Ltd.  
Mijura Stone (P) 
Shin-A Chemical (Ind)  














Stone Good  
Elec. Part  
Elec. Toy  




































Source: Bank of Korea quoted in Krishan (1995)                                                              Continued … 
Table 5-B. Korean Investment in India, 1992-94 
 
                                                          
40 Times of India (New Delhi), 24 February 1996.  









As on June 30, 1994 
Unit: US $ 1,000 
Approved Equity Amount  
Hanil Era Textiles  
Karan Woo Sin Ltd.  
Mardia Samyoung Capital  
Buoy Dae Fishery  
Montana Intl Ltd.  
Shin-A Chemical Pvt. 
Korin Hair Processing  
Advanced Lightening  
Chang Yun India Ltd.  
TDT Copper Ltd.  
DCM Hyundai Ltd.  
Tai Chonbang Textile  
Samcor Glass Ltd.  
Daeyu Continental Ltd.  
Ellyoung Metal Prdts. 
Gujrat Themis Biosyn  




















Antena & Elec.  
Fishery  
Nonmetal Goods  
Petrochemical  
Human Hair  
Halogen Lamp  











































Source: Bank of Korea quoted in Krishan (1995) 
 
 
Of this, investments that were made in the period preceding India’s economic 
liberalization were fractional and were largely confined to trading activities. However, since 
liberalization Korean approvals of investments increased both in value and volume of 
projects. Majority of these approvals were in labor-intensive sector. Apart from labor-
intensive production, Korean companies have since ventured into areas opened up after 
liberalization including electronics, textile, automobiles, telecommunications, financial 
services, shipbuilding etc. Although in the past, several small and medium-sized Korean 
companies were setting up joint ventures in such manufactures as halogen lamps, cordless 
phones, pharmaceuticals, textiles and granite processing, however since 1993 major Korean 
companies (Cheabol) started to plan investment in sectors such as infrastructure including 
power generation, highway construction, telecommunications, port development and other 
industrial sectors like cement and fertilizer and heavy and chemical industry, sectors hitherto 
reserved for India’s public sector. 
The forces unleashed by the liberal economic thought provided a stable ground for 
paradigm convergence and resultant enhanced bilateral economic cooperation. In the 
deregulated financial regime corporate Korea was much freer to borrow and invest. First 
time, many Korean companies started to consider India as a production hub to carter the 
growing demand for their expanding export industries. These include Daewoo, Hyundai, 
Samsung, LG, Ssangyong, Hanil, Exim Bank of Korea, Korea Telecom, Daelim, Dongbu, 
Korea Development Bank, Hyosung, Daecom, Hanwha, TDT, etc. India’s national body for 
small-scale industries, NSIC signed an agreement in July 1995 with the Korean Small and 
Medium Industries Promotion Corporation (SMIPC) for encouraging cooperation at the SME  
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Table 6. Foreign Direct Investment Approved 
 
Year (Jan-Dec) 
Amount in Million Dollars Percentage of ROK with total 
investment With ROK With all countries 
1991 2.5 218.3 1.16 
1992 15.1 1485.5 0.10 
1993 9.6 2890.5 0.33 
1994 34.1 4522.5 0.75 
1995 100.1 10213.9 0.98 
1996 936.6 10510.9 8.91 
1997 543.3 15302.9 3.56 
1998 93.3 7800.9 1.20 
1999 859.6 5665.6 15.17 
Total 2,596.2 58,611.0 4.70 
Source: Indian Embassy Seoul  
 
 
(Small and Medium Enterprises) level. Under the aegis of the agreement, an SME 
Investment Seminar was held in Seoul in September 1995. A South Korean SME delegation 
visited India in March 1996. In line with these interactions, approval of Korean investment in 
India has risen from US $ 70 million in 1995 to over US $ 860 million in 1999. Table 6: 
shows year-wise approval of Korean investment. 
Since 1995, Korean investment increased remarkably and Korea’s total cumulative 
investment in India as per FDI approvals rose from a mere US $2.5 millions in 1991 to US 
$2.63 billions in 2002 making it the fifth largest investor in India after the US, Mauritius, UK, 
and Japan, which was about 4 percent of its total FDI. Daewoo Group was the first to initiate 
a major investment in India by acquiring dominant equity stakes in the Daewoo-DCM 
facility in Uttar Pradesh, India. Confirming Korea’s commitment to the Indian market, 
Daewoo Motors invested more than a billion dollars to expand production facility. Korean 
commitment to strengthen Indo-Korean ties is further reflected in Hyundai Motor’s decision 
to set up a 100 percent subsidiary with integrated manufacturing facilities, unlike the CKD 
(completely knocked down) Assembly Operations by most other manufacturers. This 
subsidiary has brought in manufacturing and engineering expertise of world-class standards. 
Hyundai has achieved 80 percent indigenization level.  
Among the numerous Korean investors, LG Electronics and Chemicals has invested US 
$100 million while the Samsung group has made an initial investment of over US $50 
million in production facilities of white and brown consumer goods for the Indian market. 
Hyundai Construction & Engineering Corporation is in the middle of constructing a huge 
Techno Park in Chennai city. Its big power plant project in the Mangalore and Goa area is 
also progressing well. In Andhra Pradesh Korea Heavy Industries Ltd is constructing the 
Kondapally Thermal Power Plant and LG Polymer India Ltd. is operating a chemical plant in 
the port of Vishakapatnam. LG Telecommunications Ltd is trying to make inroads in the 
Indian telecom industry with attention to the Hyderabad area. It has contract with the mobile 
handsets with the Reliance Infocom. The Indian Silicon Valley housed in the state of 
Karnataka is definitely being a fertile place for ‘hybrid’ sharing of technology, information 




and expertise with Korea. In Bangalore, the foundation for such a partnership has already 
been laid by the establishment of research centers by both LG Soft India and Samsung Soft 
India. 
With the cutting edge in the field of construction, some of the Korean companies are 
involved in development projects such as highways, power plants, chemicals, petrochemicals 
and metro rail projects in India. Furthermore, Korea and India have also close relationship in 
the field of shipbuilding and energy exploitation. Korean companies like Hyundai Heavy 
Industry, Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine & Engineering, and Samsung Heavy Industry have 
contributed to the development of offshore plant project and supplied various vessels such as 
oil tanker carriers, cargo-ships and LNG carriers. Korea’s long-term commitment to India 
signals Korea’s move away from the past market-seeking short-term approach to the long-
term production-seeking approach. 
Annual two-way trade also reflects this transformed economic relationship. The annual 
two-way trade volume between the two countries was recorded US $2.6 billion (I changed it 
from changed from 2.6 billion dollars) in the year 2002. Korea’s trade volume with India 
recorded 0.84 percent of its total trade in the year 2002, whereas India’s trade with Korea 
posted 2.2 percent of its total trade in the fiscal year 2001-02. Korean companies like LG, 
Samsung and Hyundai are now household names in India. Table 7-A, 7-B and 7-C show 
recent spurt in trade between India and Korea.  
 
Table 7-A. India-ROK Trade 
Exports by India (All figures in US $ million)  







27 Mineral fuels/oil and distillation 123.475 161.573 30.85 
23 Oil cake 76.077 118.417 55.65 
52 Cotton 106.281 109.595 3.02 
26 Iron Ore 56.348 52.611 -6.63 
29 Organic Chemical 44.675 48.739 9.10 
10 Cereals 34.478 21.919 -36.43 
72 Iron and Steel 28.141 17.932 -36.28 
84 Machinery & Mechanical Appliances 11.983 17.199 43.53 
 Others 115.649 676.092 13.23 
Source: Indian Export Bulletin, 2002 
Korean Statistics (Imported FOB basis, Exports on CIF basis).  
 
Table 7-B. India-ROK Trade 
Export-Import by India (All figures in US $ million)  
Year/Months 2000 2001 Jan-Jun 2001 Jan-Jun 2002 Growth (%) 
Export 984.705 1105.631 597.107 676.092 13.23 
Import 1,326.165 1,407.728 783.832 621.614 -20.70 
Total 2,310.870 2513.359 1,380.939 1,297.706 -6.03 
Trade Deficit -341.460 -302.097 -186.725 54.478 129.18 
Source: Indian Export Bulletin, 2002 
Korean Statistics (Imported FOB basis, Exports on CIF basis). 
Table 7-C. India-ROK Trade 
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Imports by India (All figures in US $ million) 
 







84 Machinery & Mechanical Appliances 120.692 122.982 1.90 
85 
Electrical Machinery & 
Equipment 
170.665 106.147 -37.80 
87 Vehicles, Railway or Tramway 46.137 60.513 31.16 
39 Plastics/Rubber and Articles there of 33.605 37.860 12.66 
89 Ships, boats and floating structures 146.569 37.253 -74.58 
72 Iron & Steel 36.372 28.370 -22.00 
29 Organic Chemicals 36.372 26.461 -27.25 
54 Man-made Filaments 29.980 26.287 -12.32 
 Others 163.440 175.742 7.53 
 Total 783.832 621.614 -20.70 
Source: Indian Export Bulletin, 2002; Korean Statistics (Imported FOB basis, Exports on CIF basis).  
 
 
4.3. Dominance of Managerial Logic  
Take off under Cluster-seeking Phase, 2000s~present 
 
The vibrant nature of the relationship between the two countries got further boost with 
the visits of the President of Korea Roh Moo Hyun to India in 2004, followed by that of 
President Abdul Kalam to Korea in February 2006. During the Korean President’s visit, both 
sides agreed to establish a “Long-term Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”, 
which will seek to take advantage of economic complementarities and political convergences 
to forge closer and more extensive cooperation in bilateral/multilateral affairs. A Treaty on 
Extradition and another Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters were signed 
by Indian Foreign Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea, Mr. Ban 
Ki-moon in the presence of Prime Minister and President Roh. Also, both countries have 
decided to conclude an agreement on exemption of visa requirement for holders of 
diplomatic and official passports. President Roh Moo-hyun’s visit confirmed Korea’s new 
attitude to India appropriately reflected in its ‘Chindia strategy’. The President’s visit also 
provided the needed push for Korean companies to move into new business fields. 
Indian President Abdul Kalam’s in his visit to Korea in 2006, called for greater co-
operation in the field of science and technology to harness the full potential of cordial 
bilateral relationship. He stressed on the fact that the Korean prowess in the field of 
computer hardware and the Indian software capabilities had great joint potential. President 
added that with the irreversible trend of regional integration in Asia, we increasingly look at 
Korea as a key element in our “Look East” policy and a trusted partner in our vision for a 
dynamic and vibrant Pan-Asian Community of peace and prosperity. 
High level of political commitment to further advance Indo-Korean bilateral cooperation 
provided strong stimulus to business leaders of both sides. India’s Tata Motors, Mumbai, 
signed an agreement for acquiring Daewoo Commercial Vehicles, Kunsan (South Korea) at a 
cost of US$ 102 million in February 2004. Having established leadership in various product 
categories, Korean business initiated various policies targeted to enhance its competitive 
edge in the price sensitive Indian market. In this period, spatial distribution of Korean 




industry in India shows sings of inward-cooperation, which envisions efficiency gains in 
promoting Korean industrial clusters – where information sharing, components sourcing, 
financial & marketing coordination becomes internal, and in turn reduces transaction cost. 
Many scholars, particularly endogenous growth theorists, have focused on the role of 
knowledge spillovers and their role in generating increasing returns (Krugman 1991). A 
study by Audretsch and Feldman (1996) shows that even after controlling for the degree of 
geographic concentration in production, there is a clustering of innovative activities in 
industries where knowledge spillovers play a decisive role. Other recent studies have 
emphasized the role of universities and education institutions and public laboratories in 
encouraging cluster formation (Audretsch and Lehman 2005). Empirical results coming out 
of these studies suggest that a high level of qualified and skilled labor force and the presence 
of good universities is a necessary condition for regional innovation. Likewise, the study by 
Asheim and Coenen (2005) on Nordic clusters also emphasizes the key role played by the 
supply of a highly skilled labor force and access to scientific excellence. Motivated by the 
logic of industrial clustering, Korean business has created a regional strategy to efficiently 
carter market needs of a vastly diversified Indian economy. The clustering of Korean 
business in India has also provided excellent opportunities to SMEs to join big business 
bandwagon. During this period, India witnessed [a huge entry in number of vendors – is this 
what you mean?] attached with conglomerates as well as SMEs. About 370 Korean 
companies are operating in Delhi (electronics industry) Chennai (automobile industry), Pune, 
Maharashtra (white goods industry) and in many other areas in India. Korea’s expanded 
business presence in various parts of India has facilitated ‘take off’ in their bilateral 
economic relations. Geographic distribution of Korean industrial activities in India can be 
classified under the following industrial clusters:  
 
A. LG-Samsung-led Consumer Electronics Cluster in National Capital Region (NCR) 
History of Korean business in India begins from the NCR, which offered competitive 
infrastructure, closeness to government, and capital city’s fast expanding consumer class.41 
Spearheaded by LG electronics, located in NOIDA (New Okhla Industrial Development 
Authority), the NCR became the initial industrial cluster for Korean manufacturing. Now, 
LG Electronics India plans to emerge as a $10-billion company in 2010 by consolidating the 
company’s market share in consumer electronics, home appliances, information technology 
and mobile phone markets.42
The next Korean major was Samsung India Electronics Pvt. Ltd. which currently 
produces color televisions, color monitors, refrigerators and washing machines at its existing 
 It is also planning to make India its global export hub and target 
countries in SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), South Africa and 
UAE (United Arab Emirates).  
                                                          
41  National Capital Region (NCR), comprised of India’s capital Delhi and the adjoining areas of 
neighboring states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Rajasthan, is emerging as the most important 
business centre of the country. The NCR is unique because of the intensity of population and its huge 
purchasing power as well as the agglomeration of businesses. NCR contributes about 4 per cent to 
India’s gross domestic product (GDP), with tax collections contributing 15 per cent of the total, 
according to analysts. For further details, see  http://www.scribd.com/doc/12751005/The-NCR-is-
Emerging-as-the-Most-Important-Business-Centre-of-the-Country. 
42  For details, see http://www.domain-b.com/companies/companies_l/lg_electronics/20050322_ 
turnover.html 
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manufacturing complex at NOIDA. Samsung India has announced to set up a 1-million 
mobile phone manufacturing facility in the NCR, and also plans to jack up the capacity to 20 
million by 2010. A refrigerator manufacturing facility has been established by Samsung 
India Electronics Ltd in Noida. This refrigerator facility is Samsung’s fourth overseas 
refrigerator manufacturing facility and the fifth in the world. This state-of-the-art, modern 
facility has an initial production capacity of 500,000 units per annum, which can be 
subsequently enhanced depending on the company’s requirements.43
LG Electronics and Samsung India are also exporters of TVs, washing machines, air 
conditioners, color monitors, from India. Both LG and Samsung have become household 
name in India even beating their arch-rivals such as Sony, Hitachi and Toshiba brands in the 
price sensitive Indian market. Statistics show that LG and Samsung command between them 
a market share of 24 percent in the color television market, 40 percent in the refrigerator 
industry’s frost free segment, 38 percent in the air- conditioning industry, and close to 55 
percent in the microwave oven segment.
 Investing around US 
$135 million in India, Samsung India generates 1.8 per cent of the annual turnover of the 
South Korean parent Samsung Electronics. The Indian subsidiary also has substantial 
revenue from the export of refrigerators, televisions, washing machines and color monitors to 




B. Hyundai-led Auto Industry Cluster in Chennai, Tamil Nadu 
Korea’s initial success prompted auto major Hyundai Motors to firm-up its India Strategy. 
Parent Hyundai Motor company established its subsidiary Hyundai Motor India Ltd (HMIL) 
at Irrunattukottia, near Chennai, in 1997 with an initial investment of US $614 million. 
Indian plant is the largest manufacturing facility of Hyundai Motor Company outside Korea. 
Hyundai is the second largest and the fastest growing car manufacturer in the country, which 
markets over 18 variants of passenger cars across four models. The company emerged as the 
second largest exporter of passenger cars from the country. Hyundai Motor India Ltd, 
registered total sales of 489,328 vehicles in the calendar year (CY) 2008, an increase of 49.6 
percent over CY 2007. In the domestic market it clocked a growth of 22.4 percent with 
245387 units in 2008, while overseas sales grew by 92.5 percent, with exports accounting for 
243,931 units in 2008.45 In continuation of its commitment to provide the Indian customer 
with global technology, HMIL commissioned its second plant in February 2008 which 
produces an additional 300,000 units per annum, raising HMIL’s total production capacity to 
600,000 units per annum. HMIL has invested to expand capacity in line with its positioning 
as HMC’s global export hub for compact cars. Apart from the expansion of production 
capacity, HMIL currently has 251 strong dealer network across India, which will be further 
bolstered in 2009. For the procurement of automobile parts, HMIL has 78 venders, among 
them 49 venders supply 59 percent of the automobile parts. These venders are located within 
the radius of 50 km from the HMIL in Chennai.46
                                                          
43 For  further details, see  http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20021211/ncr1.htm 
    
44 “LG and Samsung ‘Take Over’ India’s Consumer durables Market,” Emerging Markets Economy, 
April 8, 2003, at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4174/is_20030408/ai_n12918145/  
45 For further details, see  http://www.hyundai.co.in/aboutusn.asp?pageName=comp 
46 For the details about HMIL-led automobile cluster, see Jongsoo Park, “Foreign Direct Investment in 
India since 1991: A Korean Perspective”, in Sushila Narasimhan and D.Y. Kim (eds.), India and 
Korea: A Forging Relationship (New Delhi: Manak, 2005).  




Following the grand success of Hyundai Motors, Samsung Electronics has established its 
second Indian manufacturing complex in Sriperumbudur, Chennai, producing CTVs, 
refrigerators, air conditioners and washing machines. According to Samsung India Deputy 
Managing Director Ravinder Zutshi, Sriperumbudur manufacturing unit of Samsung is the 
“biggest” in the Indian consumer electronics industry. The manufacturing facility has a 
production capacity of 1.5 million units per annum for Flat TVs and 0.3 million units per 
annum for LCD TVs.47
 
 LG electronics which has major market in South India also has plans 
to establish manufacturing facility in this area. Not only Samsung and LG but many other 
Korean corporations have set-up their facilities in the region. At present, more than 120 
Koran companies are located in this fast emerging Koran industrial cluster.  
C. POSCO-led Steel Industry Cluster in Paradeep, Orissa 
POSCO, the world’s third largest steel company with over 30 million tonnes per annum 
(mtpa) capacity and diversified operations in 16 countries, entered India in 2005. POSCO has 
proposed to build a 12 million tonne steel plant at an investment of around US $12 billion 
with the necessary accompanying infrastructure using the Finex process which overcomes 
the dependence on coking coal at Jagatsinghpur District of Orissa (10 km south of Paradip 
Port, Orissa) A bi-national Project between India and Korea, the POSCO-India project has 
three main elements, consisting of the integrated steel plant, as well as the development of 
mines and related infrastructure.48
POSCO intends to set up a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Orissa to manufacture 
superior steel and export 6.3 million tonnes of its production. This would help in achieving 
the target for exports set by India’s National Steel Policy (NSP) – 2005 — annually 26 
million tonnes by 2019. POSCO-India would build an “Indian township” and a “Korean 
township” with modern amenities to house all employees in the SEZ and the Domestic Tariff 
Area (DTA). Following in the footsteps of steel major POSCO, South Korean companies 
have evinced a keen interest in the Indian market, proposing a plethora of investment 
proposals worth $2.8 billion in steel, mines and the power sector. Following POSCO’s 
announcement, around 50-60 South Korean companies have expressed their keenness to set 
up shop in the state. POSCO has requested the state to develop a 2000-acre patch close to the 
 During Phase I of the project, POSCO-India will construct 
railway sidings in the mining areas and the plant site and link it to the main railway line. The 
Central Government has also been carrying out the construction of railways in the Banspani-
Tomka and Cuttack-Paradip sections. In accordance with the MoU, the Government of 
Orissa has actively considered improving accessibility by establishing road links and 
developing existing local roads that connect the proposed steel plant and township zone. 
POSCO-India will also construct access roads for efficient construction and operation. A 
Captive Port will be developed at the mouth of the Jatadhari River, 10 km from Paradip, for 
exclusive use by POSCO-India in order to secure consistent and timely movement of raw 
materials and products. In the sector of power, POSCO-India has plans to set up a Captive 
Power Plant (CPP) with an estimated capacity of 1300 MW per annum, and will install a 
power transmission facility to receive power from the Paradip GRIDCO substation to meet 
the requirements during construction period. Water for the steel plant will be sourced from 
the Jobra Barrage of the Mahanadi River.  
                                                          
47 Andy Mukherjee, “Sriperumbudur seeks will to be a Shenzhen” (March 16, 2007), at http://www. 
livemint.com/articles/2007/03/16002659/Sriperumbudur-seeks-will-to-be.html 
48 For further details about the project, see http://posco-india.com/website/project/details.htm 
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proposed factory to set up downstream and ancillary industries. 
 
D. Samsung-LG-led White Goods Cluster in Pune, Maharashtra 
South Korean consumer electronic giant LG has established its mobile phone and DVD 
player manufacturing unit at the Ranjangaon Industrial Estate near Pune, that commenced 
operations in October 2004. Covering over 50 acres, the facility manufactures LCD TV, 
GSM Phones, Color Televisions, Air Conditioners, Refrigerators, Microwave Ovens Color 
Monitors. LG Electronics has given a major thrust to push its mobile handsets in the Indian 
market. The LG Electronics, has shifted its UK-based microwave oven manufacturing 
facility to its Ranjangaon plant, “Microwave ovens are not a high-value product and moving 
to India helps cut down cost, as India offers cheap labor and raw materials compared with 
that in UK,” said Kwang-Ro Kim, president, South West Asia, LG Electronics Inc and 
managing director, LGEIL. South Korean firm Hyundai Heavy Industries has signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Maharashtra Government for setting up a 
construction equipment plant in the state. Hyundai would invest about Rs 260 crore in the 
proposed plant at Chakan near Pune. The MoU was signed by Maharashtra’s Principal 
Secretary (Industries) V.K. Jairath and Hyundai Chief Operating Officer K.H. Park in the 
presence of Industries Minister Ashok Chavan here. The Maharashtra government has 
identified the Hyundai Chakan plant as a “mega project”. Also, LG’s four South Korean 
vendors, which include companies such as Starrion, Dongli and Nanco, are also coming to 
Ranjangaon. They will be investing another Rs 200 crore and have been allotted 20 acres of 
land at the Ranjangaon MIDC. Taking clue from LG, Hyundai Electronics has plans to grow 
its consumer durables business in India. At present a major portion of the company’s sales is 
contributed by its flat screen televisions and the company is likely to increase its product 
portfolio this year adding microwave ovens, frost-free refrigerators among other white goods. 
Hyundai Electronics is keen to establish its production facilities in this region.  
Creation of Korean industrial clusters led to substantial deepening of industrial activities 
and subsequent increase in the combativeness of Korean products in India. Table 8 shows 
impressive growth in the volume of export-import between India and Korea during 2000s. 
These upcoming Korean industrial clusters have the potential to achieve economies of 
scale, and emerge as competitive hubs of manufacturing in India. Among the OECD 
countries, Korea is the first country with which India has completed the JSG report. The 
Indo-Korea Joint Study Group (JSG) has recommended that India and Korea should enter 
into a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) covering, among other 
things, Trade in goods; Trade in services; Measures for Trade Facilitation; Promotion, 
facilitation and liberalization of investment flows; Measures for promoting bilateral 
economic cooperation in identified sectors; and Other areas to be explored for furthering 
bilateral partnership.  
Converging theoretical paradigms have paved the way for a comprehensive economic 
partnership envisaged under the India-Korea CEPA, which can greatly assist the two 
countries’ to foster economic partnership at all levels. Liberalization of goods under the 
CEPA would bring about an overall increase in trade flow between the two economies and 
promote further inter-industry trade. Efficiency in the service sector is crucial for the further 
economic growth of both Korea and India, which can be achieved through liberalization of 
trade in services. For the further expansion of bilateral investment flows, the two countries 
are committed to improve their investment environments by removing constraints to foreign  
Table 8. India’s Export-Import to Korea 




(Value in US $ Millions)   
 
Year 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 
Export 764.86 1,041.68 1,827.21 2,512.76 2,853.19 
%Growth  36.19 75.41 37.52 13.55 
India’s Total Export 63,842.55 83,535.95 103,090.54 126,262.67 162,983.90 
%Growth  30.85 23.41 22.48 29.08 
%Share 1.2 1.25 1.77 1.99 1.75 
Import 2,829.17 3,508.77 4,563.85 4,802.26 6,040.58 
%Growth  24.02 30.07 5.22 25.79 
India’s Total Import 78,149.11 111,517.44 149,165.73 185,604.10 251,562.26 
%Growth  42.7 33.76 24.43 35.54 
%Share 3.62 3.15 3.06 2.59 2.4 
Total Trade 3,594.03 4,550.45 6,391.06 7,315.02 8,893.78 
%Growth  26.61 40.45 14.46 21.58 
India’s Total Trade 141,991.66 195,053.38 252,256.27 311,866.78 414,546.15 
%Growth  37.37 29.33 23.63 32.92 
%Share 2.53 2.33 2.53 2.35 2.15 
Trade Balance      
India’s Trade  
Balance 
-14,306.56 -27,981.49 -46,075.20 -59,341.43 -88,578.36 
Exchange rate:  
(1US$ = Rs.) 
45.9516 44.9315 44.2735 45.2849 40.241 
Source: Department of Commerce, Export-import data bank, various years 




investment on an institutional basis. Indian and Korean enterprises, which are quickly 
emerging as significant sources of outward investment, could be made even more attractive 
to third country FDI by enlarging the market through a bilateral agreement such as the CEPA. 
The CEPA will also help form a bridge between South Asia and North East Asia and 




5. POLICY LESSONS  
 
During the first LIEO, India-Korea bilateral economic cooperation failed to pick-up as 
trade liberalization was primarily dictated by the needs of imperialism, not the demands of 
economic fundamentals/ or the forces of demand and supply. India, a part of the British 
colonial-imperial system, and Korea, falling under the harsh Japanese colonialism after 
centuries of subordinate relations with China, could not benefit from the free trade doctrine 
                                                          
49 For the larger implications of CEPA on both Korea and India, see Choong Yong Ahn, “Korea-India 
Economic Cooperation: Performance and Issues”, paper presented at 8th Korea-India Dialogue, New 
Delhi, May 20-21, 2009.    
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promoted by imperial interests. In the intervening period between two LIEOs, which spans 
from post-WW I to the end of Cold War period, India-Korea bilateral cooperation suffered 
due to the growing capitalist-communist dichotomy. During this period, paradigm diverged 
so sharply that earlier era trade, investment and market linkages largely collapsed.  
The second coming of LIEO ending paradigmatic dichotomy revitalizes old trade-
investment links and facilitated/forged new economic interactions. By taking the advantage 
of existing paradigmatic convergence, both India and Korea have successfully redefined 
bilateral economic cooperation which already transcendent remnants of Cold War era 
structural barriers. Indeed, economic cooperation between the two countries has come a long 
way; however the legacy of differing regulatory structures/regimes in finance, industry, and 
bureaucracy will die hard. Analysis in this paper points to the fact that time has come to 
remove the remaining bottlenecks by initiating a proactive policy framework, which can 
enhance institutional infrastructure with clear targets. Following policy lessons can be taken 
into consideration to further expand bilateral economic cooperation:  
 
1. In the absence of any significant political road blocs between India and Korea, growing 
trend of bilateral FTAs between other Asian economies, and following the commencement of 
CEPA negotiations in March 2006 conducting 12 rounds of negotiations and concluding 3 
inter-sessions, it is highly desirable that India and Korea should sign CEPA. India’s relative 
edge in the service sector and Korea’s comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector 
makes both economies a fit case to sign the cooperation agreement. This will result in a win-
win situation for both economies.50
2. Before global political economic and strategic interests start to alter paradigmatic 
convergence, India and Korea must create institutional infrastructure that can bring 
visionaries, regional experts and policy makers at one platform. This may include 
establishment of India-Korea Imminent Person’s Group, coordination committees on specific 
industrial sectors, and the establishment of research center to analyze and manage social, 
political fallout of important economic decisions and policies. This can help widen the 
ASEAN+3 to a more open entity (Ahn, 2009).    
 
3. Increasing number of Korean residents in and around emerging industrial clusters in 
India, and growing number of Indian nationals in Korea are vital resources in further 
deepening of mutual understanding. Consequently, people to people interaction between the 
two countries has increased substantially in the recent times; however there is need to 
institutionalize these interactions aimed at strengthening ‘Track-II Diplomacy’.  
4. By taking the advantage of Korea’s globally competitive manufacturing prowess, India 
has created various Korean industrial clusters; however Korea lags behind in taking 
advantage of India’s emergent service industry, particularly in the field of software 
development, English language education and financial and banking services.  
5. Both governments need to study regulations governing bilateral investment, production 
and market access. In the wake of Asia-wide move to create Asian Economic Community, 
common Indo-Korean policies to rationalize regulations can positively contribute in the 
evolving Asian economic order.  
                                                          
50 For India, signing of CEPA with Korea is crucial to achieve long-term stated developmental goals as 
it can provide vast Korean market for knowledge-intensive services, whereas Korea can improve 
market access to India for its formidable manufacturing industry. For deeper insight, see Choong 
Yong Ahn (2009).     








The analysis largely conforms to the basic assumption set forth in this paper that the 
economics of CTPs deeply affects the structure and nature of RECs. It concludes that the 
script of economic interaction has always been played well on similar economic thoughts. It 
highlights that the diverging economic paradigms create dissimilar regulatory structure and 
pushes economic cooperation to take a back seat. During the Cold War period, diverging 
paradigms based on the capitalist-socialist dichotomy led to the fragmentation of RECs. It 
argues that a new economic dynamics begins with the end of Cold War era capitalist-
socialist dichotomy when mainstream economic thinking started to converge around market-
based system. This led to an unprecedented market revolution transforming the economies of 
former communist bloc. Not only transition economies adopted market-based system but 
many other economies started to rethink the activist role of state in the market place. Termed 
as second LIEO, the neo-liberal revolution paved the way for a single world economy and 
with it a new economic order capable of transforming the regimes of economic cooperation.  
The analysis of India-Korea economic cooperation provides a convincing empirical 
rationale that paradigmatic convergence positively affects bilateral/multilateral economic 
cooperation. Exclusively ‘market-seeking’ bilateral economic cooperation approach between 
India and Korea before 1990s confirms that dissimilar regulatory structures based on the 
paradigm divergence, adversely constrain bilateral economic interaction. On the other hand, 
CTPs create matching regulatory structures of ‘production-seeking’ era after 1990s confirm 
that the economics of paradigm convergence can stimulate wider economic interaction. The 
take-off phase in the bilateral economic cooperation starts with the application of managerial 
logic to streamline Korea’s ‘India strategy’. This new strategy led to the ‘cluster-seeking 
approach’ which facilitated larger move led by big business and followed by Korean SMEs 
to establish their presence in the Indian market.  
However, one should not take for granted the paradigm convergence, as currently 
declining global economy with shrinking demand may unleash forces that can adversely 
affect market-based economic systems. In order to safeguard the current momentum in the 
bilateral economic cooperation between India and Korea, both nations should be vigilant to 
protect open market system and the free flow of capital, goods and possibly labor.  
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